The following is a message Warren sent to me, and asked me to forward to the list.
-AT ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Warren Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Aug 11, 2005 3:00 PM Subject: Re: [EM] Center for Range Voting Formed To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Adam Tarr, [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Warren, Your "strategic Condorcet" strategy is a terrible strategy in most situations. Why do you think burying your least favorite frontrunner would help you? Even more puzzling, why put your favorite frontrunner in front of your true favorite? There are specific, very narrow situations where these sorts of strategies can be useful. But They are absolutely the exception and not the rule (at least in winning vote Condorcet). A simple sincere ordering is more strategically adept as a default strategy, for most good Condorcet voting methods. I know if I were voting in an MMV election or a Beatpath election, I'd much prefer voting that way to burying the second. --WDS REPLY: I did not say it was the best strategy. I merely claim it is an obvious strategy, which *sometimes* is best, that many members of the public will adopt. If that be so, then Condorcet will prevent third party candidates from winning. >On the other hand, your Range voting strategies seems pretty spot-on. So to me, the most accurate comparison I can make using your simulation is sincere Condorcet against strategic Range. Condorcet wins, by your simulation. WDS REPLY: Comparing honest-voter condorcet-LR versus strategic-range=stategic-approval, yes, the former does win, at least in the 2 example election scenarios with 5 candidates on the CRV site. However honest-condorcet-LR does better in one and worse in the other case shown, versus honest-voter-approval, and worse in both cases versus honest-voter-range. Consulting the larger data compilation at http://math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/voFdata we find that honest-voter condorcet-LR is usually (always?) better than strategic-range=strategic-approval. However, I do not see why this is "the most accurate comparison." Seems to me the most valid comparison is honest v honest or strategic v strategic. In the hon v hon comparison, range beats condorcet. In the str v str comparison range also beats condorcet, however with the CAVEAT that the condorcet voters in my sim were not using their optimum voting strategy (which is, as far as I know, unknown) but instead were using the vote which would have been strategically optimum for them if it were a Borda vote (if I recall right) which is known. (This is stated in my study, no attempt to delude on the issue...) --I am note sure whether your letter to me was CCd to the EM list. If it was, then please also post this reply on that list. Thank you. wds ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
