On 29 Aug 2005 at 16:06 UTC-0700, Forest Simmons wrote: > More discussion on this is found in the thread which contains the > following seminal message: > > http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-March/015316.html > > explaining how DMC, AWP, and "Approval Margins" (AM) are related to > each other, and how they fit into the family of Condorcet methods, and > also comparing their effectiveness against burying. > > Here's when I first saw the light that DMC was the best Condorcet > proposal: > > http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-March/015418.html >
Forest is too modest. DMC/RAV finds the same winner as a method he proposed earlier. At one time, he called it, variously, Approval Sorted Condorcet, Approval Seeded Bubble Sort, or Bubble Sorted Approval. Lately I've taken to calling it Pairwise Sorted Approval. It was first proposed in March 2001: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2001-March/005448.html The main difference (advantage?) of the DMC/RAV formulation is that it finds the winner directly. But the social ordering that results from determining the DMC winner, removing that winner, finding the DMC runner up, etc. is exactly the pairwise-sorted approval ordering. Q -- araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com http://www.metafilter.com/user/23101 http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/User:Araucaria Q = Qoph = "monkey/knot" -- see http://www.ship.edu/~cgboeree/alphabet.html ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
