Dear Warren!

You wrote:
> In particular, since this thread came from a discussion of the DMC 
> condorcet-approval hybrid
> voting method,  I point out that I do not believe DMC is   
> cloneproof[strat2-revote]  either!

What, exactly, is the definition of cloneproof[strat2-revote]?

> --They understand the system fine.   Range voting is very easy to understand, 
> easier than 
> DMC in fact.  What they do not understand, is utility values!

I guess that's because you cannot easily understand what doesn't exist.

> But DMC and all other systems also have that same problem - voters have
> trouble understanding utility values and hence have trouble choosing either 
> their most honest,
> or most strategic vote.   In fact in DMC (or more simply, approval voting)
> to choose your most strategic vote, you have to know the utility values
> of the candidates.  
> If you merely know the ordering of those values, that is insufficient
> information to choose the most-strategic approval-vote!

Nope. As I'm not an expected-utility-maximizer I prefer to vote
according to Weinstein's strategy and approve of every candidate above
the median of my priors.

> So in fact, you are trying to pretend this problem is absent in DMC, but you 
> are wrong.

I don't pretend such a thing. I think also specifying approval is
already a non-trivial task for voters because of the vagueness of
"approval". But it is still far easier for me to say whether I approve a
candidate than to assign a cardinal rating to him.

> It is present everywhere.  As a first step toward progress you need to admit 
> the true
> state of affairs - which is utilitarian and that cannot be escaped, sorry - 
> and 
> then go on from there.

So nice that you know the truth. It should help you get out of your
utilitarian trap.

> --yes we know it.  If I define a quantity, or merely show it can be defined, 
> then
> we know a definition exists.

I don't question the definition but the existence of cardinal utility.

>>And if you know it, you should be able to tell me your Util(Bush) and explain 
>>it to me, right?
> 
> 
> --wrong.  Just because a quantity exists does not mean I can explain it to 
> you.

So you get to that value in some miraculous way you cannot explain?

> For example, I think we both agree that a first counterample to the Riemann 
> hypothesis exists
> (where if the RH is true then the "first counterexample" is "infinity").
> But in spite of this agreement it exists, I think you cannot tell me its
> value.  (If you can, please do...)  

So, if you cannot tell the value, how can you require voters to submit
their ratings?

>>How nicely plain your world is. Ever heard of risk avoiding? Why do you think 
>>people have insurances? Do you really want to claim everyone aims at
>>maximizing expected (since it's never for sure) utility?
> 
> 
> --We are revisiting an old debate (my side is called the "Bayesians" and it 
> is generally 
> agreed in the statistical community that my side long-ago won).

I would rather say your side is called the utilitarians and the question
has nothing to do with statistics but with descriptive sociology: it is
about what people actually do.

> Anyhow.  The answer to the insurance question is that the only reason 
> insurance is
> a good idea, is that utilities of the same event differ for different people.
> 
> For example.  Suppose you are in a car crash and turn into
> a paraplegic. That is an event of huge utility (but low probability) to you.  
>   In fact it
> might cost you $1 million, which you do not have.
> However, from the insurance company's point of view this is an event of small
> expected utility.   The point is, to a poor person, $1000 has larger
> utility than $1000 has to a rich person (or insurance company).
> If you are rich and already have many $millions, then you are foolish to 
> insure
> yourself against car-crash-paralysis.  Your thinking now is the same as
> the insurance company's.
> 
> Hmm.  I am not saying this very well.  But the point is, the whole reason
> insurance exists is that utilities differ among different people, causing
> expected utilities to differ.  In fact this is the
> whole reason for every economic transaction.  This is not at all incompatible 
> with the
> Bayesian utilitarian viewpoint.

OK, I will have to think about this a bit longer :-)

> --I do not know how they do it.  I merely know I did a range voting exit poll 
> of 122
> real-world voters in 2004, and this is what happened.  You can read about it
>    http://math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html   #82.

I will have a look at this, too.

> Obviously by carrying on this debate you are not directly causing harm to 
> humanity, but
> your wrong ideas continually do cause tremendous harm to humanity, 

You should really stop this or I'll request to put your postings on
moderation.

Yours, Jobst


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