Hello Warren again. You wrote: > **First, I hear Jobst Heitzig himself (DMC's inventor)
Sorry for the misunderstanding. I understand my support of DMC led you to think I discovered that method, but that's not at all true. To my knowledge Forest, Russ and Ted had the largest share of its development. > claims his favorite method > is something else (DFC, whatever that is). !!?? Yes, of course. The reason I discussed DMC recently is simply that currently it is a big issue which *Condorcet-efficient* method will be suggested for Washington state's electoral reform. So I suggested to use my favourite *Condorcet-efficient* method DMC. Still, my favourite method is not a deterministic Condorcet method but a non-deterministic Approval/Condorcet-hybrid called DFC, which is however strongly related to DMC but it not Condorcet-efficient. Feel free to search the archives for DFC. In short, DFC is simply this: Find the set of candidates which are not doubly defeated (in the same sense as in DMC), then let a randomly chosen voter select one of them (instead of electing the Condorcet-Winner among them). > Fine. But: DMC, the supposed "unifying new champ", still appears to lead > to 2-party domination. I want you to modify DMC to get it out of this > trap, or admit you cannot. Otherwise, it seems to me, DMC has failed to > live up to your hype. (Also, the "DH3 pathology" - I want you to get DMC out > of > that one too, please: http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/DH3.html .) I will try to understand why DMC should lead to 2-party domination. As for the DH3-example: Could you explain why the A voters should start to vote A>D>B>C in the first place? Yours, Jobst ______________________________________________________________ Verschicken Sie romantische, coole und witzige Bilder per SMS! Jetzt bei WEB.DE FreeMail: http://f.web.de/?mc=021193 ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
