Warren, Neither Jobst nor I think that Condorcet methods are the ultimate. In particular there is a conjecture on the EM list that no Condorcet efficient method can satisfy the FBC, so we shouldn't expect that of DMC. If this conjecture is proven false, and it turns out that a reasonably simple Condorcet method does satisfy the DMC along with monotonicity and clone-proofness, then great. But for now DMC is far and away the best public proposal among Condorcet efficient methods. Because simplicity is essential in public elections, I would rather see adopted some kind of asset voting based on plurality or approval ballots. I'm very open minded about the method used in the negotiation stage, since once asset voting is adopted, that component could improve with experience. My main concern is that if we are going to adopt a method like DMC or Range Voting that requires ordinal or cardinal information (or both), then we need to have ballot options (like one click candidate cards) for people that don't have the patience for filling out the full ordinal or cardinal information. My main suggestion along these lines is to have a check box on each ballot next to the slate of candidates for each race that allows you to specify that your favorite's preferences be used to fill in any missing ordinal information on your ballot, i.e. to refine your partial order. If Dave Ketchum wants to bullet vote or vote equal without this option, then he can leave this box unchecked. Ballot design is essentially an information theoretic problem: how to code the ballot to maximize the expected information capacity and (in the electronic interface case) detecting coding errors before the voter logs out of the voting terminal. Best Wishes, Forest
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