The original general-purpose 19-voter FBC example from the Center for Range Voting web page http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/IncentToExagg.html: 8:B>C>A 6:C>A>B 5:A>B>C B wins under Condorcet Voting [Ranked Pairs variant, winning votes, equality-ranking permitted] according to Eric Gorr's calculator at http://www.ericgorr.net/condorcet/. (Incidentally, I think this is also the same as what has been called "Steve Eppley's MAM method.")
Modification I: In original, 3 of the 6 C>A>B voters switch to A>C>B: 8:B>C>A 3:C>A>B 3:A>C>B 5:A>B>C New result: AB tie. This is an improvement from the switched voters' point of view. Modification II: In original, 3 of the 6 C>A>B voters switch to A=C>B: 8:B>C>A 3:C>A>B 3:A=C>B 5:A>B>C B wins. (This is no change.) CONCLUSION: these 3 voters, by "betraying" their favorite third-party candidate C so that they could strategically exaggerate the major-party candidates A and B to "top and bottom", with C "middle", caused the election result to improve. But if they had only partially betrayed C by voting A=C>B, then that would not have provided enough power to change the election result. A full-power betrayal was necessary. I conclude from this, that either (1) Adam Tarr's contention that the "winning votes" and "permit equalities" enhancement of Condorcet, could avoid this kind of 2-party-domination-inducing problem, was wrong. or (2) Eric Gorr's calculator program is wrong. -Warren D. Smith [let me know n which of 1,2 you think it is. let me know if this is really the same thing as Eppley MAM. Thank you.] ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
