On Fri, 2005-09-02 at 15:17 -0400, Abd ulRahman Lomax wrote: > At 04:07 PM 9/1/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote: > >Range voting methods tend to give strategic advantage to those that are > >prone to hyperbole, i.e. those people that declare "candidates A, B, and > >C are PERFECT, while candidates D and E MIGHT AS WELL BE HITLER". Your > >strategic incentive will be to give the absolute highest rank to those > >that you approve, and the absolute lowest rank to those that you don't. > >Not everyone will do that; just the people who deeply understand the > >system and those that are prone to hyperbole. > > > >I'd just as soon not favor a system that favors those prone to > >hyperbole. That would do real damage to humanity. > > This is the core problem with higher-granularity Range. It is very > much avoided with granularity 2 range, i.e., Approval, and there are > also other ways of avoiding it. But it is not avoided in the form of > Range advocated by Mr. Smith. > > I've made the same objection, I don't recall if it was here or on the > RangeVoting list. My point in responding here is to underscore that > this is not just *me* being stubborn, which is how Mr. Smith has > attempted to describe the situation.
You made the case here, very well, I might add: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-August/016811.html I read your mail shortly after sending mine (the hazard of my shotgun approach to reading the list). In response to a point you made there: > So to go the distance, I'd suggest that Range ballots be analyzed > pairwise, and that they be normalized within the pairs.... I have not > considered all the implications, for sure. James Green-Armytage has detailed this pretty extensively: http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Cardinal_pairwise Rob ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
