Jobst wrote: > From the following natural example, it seems to me DMC and wv are > more truncation resistant than margins: > > Sincere: > 46 A>C>>B > 05 C > 49 B>C>>A > C is Condorcet Winner. > > Truncation: > 46 A>C>>B > 05 C > 49 B > C still wins in DMC and wv, but B wins in margins. > What do you think?
I agree that winning-votes is more truncation-resistant with information than margins; my understanding is that it was explicitly designed to be so. But truncation is nothing more than voting tied ranks near the bottom of the ballot, which is usually an ineffective offensive strategy under margins or winning-votes. Under either, if I were the C-first faction, I'd vote 4:C>A>B 1:C>B>A to protect C's position as much as possible, making margins just as truncation-resistant as winning-votes with information. Apparently we all agree that rational zero-info margins strategy is sincerity while rational zero-info winning-votes strategy usually prescribes equal ranks near the top of the ballot. But even with perfect information, it seems to me that the equilibria that are found when each faction protects from others' strategy as much as possible will be the same whether under margins or winning-votes. I think it would be a mistake to insist on winning-votes if it turns out that margins is an easier sell for public elections. Kevin, could you post an example that gives a favorite-betrayal incentive under margins but not winning-votes? -- Rob LeGrand, psephologist [EMAIL PROTECTED] Citizens for Approval Voting http://www.approvalvoting.org/ ______________________________________________________ Click here to donate to the Hurricane Katrina relief effort. http://store.yahoo.com/redcross-donate3/ ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
