Rob,
--- Rob Lanphier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> In thinking about proposals for public elections, it occurs to me that
> we may have dismissed Copeland's method too soon.
>
> So, why not Copeland, with a simple tiebreaker (e.g. plurality, or at
> most Minmax(wv))? That'd be very similar to how the NFL (U.S. football)
> picks the divisional champions, which is first by win-loss-tie, then by
> intradivisional win-loss-tie, then by total points scored.
I couldn't support Copeland unless you use a tiebreaker that satisfies
minimal defense. Otherwise:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
A could be elected, for instance with a plurality tiebreaker.
You suggested in a later message that plurality should be applied by
eliminating Copeland non-winners first, and then counting first preferences.
But I don't believe that is monotonic.
I don't have to tell you that a plurality tiebreaker would bring massive
favorite betrayal incentive.
Kevin Venzke
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