Simmons, Forest <simmonfo <at> up.edu> writes: > > > Jeff Fisher recently opined that DMC voters would > likely adopt the strategy of approving all candidates that they considered > certain to be beaten pairwise by their Favorite. This > would put these candidates in a better position to doubly defeat the > candidates that might otherwise beat X. > > But this strategy would also increase the chances of > doubly defeating their compromise Y. > > The only time this strategy would be safe is > when favorite X is so strong that compromise Y is not needed. > > In that case, X probably doesn't need the over-kill, > but deserves to be the winner unless the other factions are united enough to > combine against X. > > Forest
Hi Forest, In connection with this, I've made a slight change on the DMC page on electowiki. I've extended the definition somewhat: the ballot is a combination of ordinal ranking (equal ranks allowed) and approval rating. The approval rating information can be either binary approval (approved/not-approved) or finer-grained cardinal ratings ([1,0,-1] or [100,99,...,1,0]). I think this is more of a difference in implementation than the method, since the initial ordering is by total approval. In the above case, a more graduated cardinal rating (say 100-0) would allow a voter to approve weaker candidates with a low, but non-zero, rating. Using the ordinal/ratings method I posted a few days ago, the ballot would not be substantially more complicated than a plain approval-cutoff ballot. Q ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
