Has anybody ever proposed minimizing the maximum opposition rather than minimizing the maximum defeat?
I know that theoretically this could elect the Condorcet Loser, but it seems very unlikely that it would do so. It seems to me that if equality were allowed in the rankings, then this method would satisfy the FBC, since ranking Favorite equal with Compromise wouldn't increase opposition against Compromise. Venzke Kevin has recently suggested a version of this method adapted to approval ballots. I wonder how well it would work with CR ballots having resolution greater than two. You would start with the pairwise matrix whose (i,j) entry is the number of ballots expressing a preference for candidate i over candidate j. Then you would find the maximum entry in each column. Then the minimum of these numbers corresponds to the candidate whose maximum opposition is minimum. This method differs from the usual MinMax in that it considers all opposition, not just opposition resulting in defeat. Forest _______________________________________________ Election-methods mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
