On 12 Mar 2003 at 11:55, Markus Schulze wrote: -snip- > As far as I have understood Young correctly, his LIIA is intended to > be a weakening of Arrow's IIA. Therefore, in my opinion, it makes sense > to ask whether in simulations compliance with LIIA really leads to fewer > violations of IIA. -snip-
As I recall, Young claimed Local Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (LIIA) is a "slight weakening" of Arrow's IIA. Obviously Young exaggerated, since LIIA + Clone Independence is clearly significantly stronger than LIIA. Therefore, since LIIA compliance was the primary reason Young advocated Kemeny-Young, he ought to prefer a method like MAM (or perhaps a "margins" variation) if MAM's satisfaction of LIIA + Clone Independence were brought to his attention. Immunity from Majority Complaints (IMC) is stronger than LIIA, but is not intended as a weakening of IIA. Therefore it does not make sense to me to test IMC as if it were a weakening of IIA. As for your conjecture that MAM and BeatpathWinner would probably perform about the same in a simulation that adds a randomly ranked candidate (or, equivalently, a simulation that retallies after deleting a random loser, which might be easier to write), I guess I'd be willing to make a small wager that MAM would do slightly better than BeatpathWinner, based on the other random voting simulations that show MAM winners beat BeatpathWinner winners pairwise more often than vice versa. (For the results of my simulation comparing of MAM winners and BeatpathWinner winners pairwise, follow the link from www.alumni.caltech.edu/~seppley.) -- Steve Eppley _______________________________________________ Election-methods mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
