On 2003-03-21, Rob Lanphier uttered to Bart Ingles and [EMAIL PROTECTED]: >[...] and goes so far as to ponder the notion that the democratic cycles >pointed out by Arrow and Black may be a virtue.
Yes. The idea seems exceedingly weird when you bump into it for the first time. Buchanan's short further analysis in, I think, The Reason of Rules, of how majority cycling can lead to stable redistributive policy and how constitutional limitations affect the outcome is awesome as well. I heartily recommend his works -- the most important ones are even available online, at econlib.org. However, I also believe Buchanan confuses two concepts here which aren't perhaps as tightly connected as one might think. The first is cyclical majorities, in the static social choice sense of Arrow and Condorcet. The second is majority cycling in the dynamic sense of a stable oscillation between separate majorities in consequtive elections. The first will often give rise to the second, but there are further, institutional mechanisms at work here which are relevant to the public choice economist as well. As a good example, alternating majorities (stable cycles of just two ruling parties) obviously cannot be explained using static individual preference orders. I'd say the dynamic and institutional aspects of political equilibria seem to make them more markedly an issue in economics and game theory, and perhaps less amenable to analysis via formal social choice and election methods theory. I also find it a bit odd that Buchanan doesn't make the distinction -- after all, he's a notable figure among the New Institutionalists, and so ought to be able to see the difference. -- Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED], tel:+358-50-5756111 student/math+cs/helsinki university, http://www.iki.fi/~decoy/front openpgp: 050985C2/025E D175 ABE5 027C 9494 EEB0 E090 8BA9 0509 85C2 ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
