On Wed, 2 Apr 2003, Alex Small wrote in part: > One interesting thing about Approval Runoff is that strategically it > satisfies the Majority Criterion: When there is a candidate whom a > majority of the voters consider their first choice then he should win. > With adequate polling data, the majority will be aware of one another, and > they'll approve only their favorite. He's guaranteed to be one of the top > 2, and he'll also automatically win the pairwise contest. > > One possible downside: The largest single organized group of voters (not > necessarily a majority, nor a group that has a common favorite) can > guarantee a candidate's victory by only approving him and a freak. If > their favorite is a serious candidate he'll automatically beat the freak > in a pairwise contest. >
That's another good reason to restrict such methods to the Candidate Proxy context or other applications where communication and coordination are facilitated. Forest ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
