Here's the second of two forwards. I'm not satisfied with the outline structure I proposed. Now I'm thinking a hypertext format will be needed, so the document can be viewed organized either by electoral methods or by advantages & disadvantages. --Steve ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Subject: Re: [SWC] Outline-driven group writing From: Mike Ossipoff To: Steve Eppley Date: Sat, 10 Feb 96 I have no problem with that outline structure. But, it seems to me that rebuttals to "pros", and replies to the rebuttals, etc., should be included in the "pros" section, so that replies & corrections could be right after what they're replying to, rather than in a different section. So yes, propose that outline structure to the committee, and we'll find out how they feel. Unless people consider it complicated & daunting, it's fine with me. But I suggest that methods not yet proposed could have their sections written at such time as someone proposes them. If someone asks why we didn't include Copeland's method, Borda's method (Most Valuable Player Point system), rating systems like 0-10, Bucklin, Nanson's method, Young's method, the use of selections sets with Condorcet's method, Smith-Borda, etc., then we can tell them that no one proposed it, but that he/she is welcome to propose it now, and, optionally, to write contribute to the "pro" section, and we will write our pros & cons on it. Yes, I like the outline form you suggested in the last message, but I'd rather not go by categories. They're very misleading. Rank-balloting methods are so different from each other as to not belong together in a category, for instance. Copeland's method is very popular with academics, but not with any electoral reformers, and I don't like it either. A member of the ER list proposed Smith-Borda. Some academics would want "selection sets" to be used, but Condorcet's method us nearly always rejected by people when that complication is added. There are combined methods, like the Mixed Method, where rankings are counted by all the proposed methods, and a 2nd balloting held between the winners. And there are proposals that, whatever method is being used, a voter can indicate on his ballot that he wants the winner by a method _he_ specifies moved to the top of his ranking, and the count repeated--this of course would only require 1 repetition of the count, and would have the effect of letting the voter who likes MPV cast a solid vote for the MPV winner, and the voter who likes Condorcet cast a solid vote for that method's winner, regardless of what the official count method is. I'd publicly insist on that option if MPV were adopted for public elections. There are other possibilities: Bucklin (which I'll define briefly in a minute) could be modified so that the count would be repeated, and, in the 2nd count, rankings could be shortened to the length that elects someone as high as possible on that ranking. In general, there could be "Revised Vote" versions of methods, where either optionally or automatically (if most prefer), rankings could be modified after the 1st count, so as to optimize the result in the 2nd count according to that ranking. I'm just saying that there are a lot of possibilities, and some of them are popular with academics or have been proposed on ER. If we undertake to include all those methods & categories in an initial outline, it will confuse people. Better to let people add methods that they propose. There's nothing wrong with that simplification; anyone on ER could propose any method to us at any time, for us to include in the outline. Bucklin: Everyone's vote goes to the top candidate in their ranking. If no one has a majority, then each ranking, additionally, gives a vote to its 2nd place candidate. If no one has votes exceeding half the number of voters, then each ranking again gives a vote to its next candidate. This continues till either a candidate has votes exceeding half the number of voters, or all rankings have given to all their choices, whichever happens 1st. At that time the candidate with most votes wins. *** Bucklin was used in several U.S. cities, earlier in this century, including SF. I consider it the best easily-hand-counted method, but not really a choice for public elections, now that we have computers. *** Copeland is a Pairwise-Count method, like Condorcet's method. Copeland: As in Condorcet's method, A beats B if more voters rank A over B than vice-versa. Each candidate's Copeland score is calculated by subtracting the number of candidates who beat him from the number that he beats. The candidate with the highest Copeland score wins. Very tie-prone, even in public elections. e.g. With just 3 candidates, if no one beats everyone, a tie is inevitable. Doesn't get rid of lesser-of-2-evils problem. Again, the category of Pairwise-Count methods is misleading, since it includes Copeland & Smith-Borda, whose merit is drastically less than that of Condorcet's method. *** Smith-Borda: If no 1 candidate beats each one of the others, then, choose a winner from the Smith set--the smallest set of candidates such that every candidate in the set beats every candidate outside the set. Choose from that set using Borda's method--the point system that gives each candidate in your ranking a point score according to where he is in your ranking. Each rank position is worth 1 point less than the rank position above it. Carl Wilson proposes Smith-Borda. It's no good. Neither is Copeland's method, though neither is as bad as MPV. *** Some academic authors would insist that the winner always be someone in the Smith set. Ideally a good thing, but most people consider too complicated any method-definition that mentions the Smith set. *** Nanson's method repeatedly eliminates the candidate with lowest Borda score. It was used in a Wisconsin city at one time, and still is proposed once in a while. Picks Condorcet winner if each voter sincerely ranks all the candidates, but doesn't have Condorcet's method's valuable lesser-of-2-evils & majority-rule properties. *** You get the idea: There are _lots_ of methods that have been proposed, and which still have proponents. We don't want to undertake to include all of them in the outline. *** I do believe that a general dicussion of methods would be a good thing, after the committee's task is completed. But start with just the proposed methods, so we can get a result. And then cover all the methods, and if that broader study uncovers a better method then we can revise our recommendation & FAQ. *** The "revised vote" methods is something that has only recently occurred to me, at least as a general category. It's unquestionably useful with some methods, but I don't know how many would be helped by it. For instance I haven't thoroughly worked out its use in Bucklin, but it is clearly useful in Condorcet's method, with a devious electorate, as are several other refinements. My Condorcet proposal is the most basic no-frills one, because that's the only one that gets any acceptance. It's still better than any other proposed method that I know of, though there's always the possibility that other good methods can turn up, such as the possibility of a good revised-vote Bucklin method. Obviously any proposals would be limited to precisely-defined & completely-worked-out methods. But even with that limitation, the number of methods is huge. *** This, I realize, is a completely un-structured letter. That's just occurred to me. It hadn't occurred to me till now to do structure it. *** In summary, those are my suggestions. 1) Categories are controversial-- and don't do a good job of separating methods of different merit. 2) There are too many methods to include them all, and I suggest just including proposed methods, with the understanding that any SWC member, or any ER member can propose one at any time, to be added to the outline, after which anyone can contribute to its pros or cons. 3) In general I agree with your recent outline propsal, & I'm for it if others don't object. [About revised-vote Bucklin, it may turn out to be one of those false-leads that sometimes come up in the search for good single- winner methods. It isn't worth discussing now, but it's the kind of thing that someone could add when/if it's ready] *** An interesting possible topic, after the initial task, & the general study (if we organize things that way) would be a discussion & recommendation on _small elections_, as opposed to public elections. Because of their extreme tie-proneness, small elections (like our vote on ER list solutions) have their own complications, mainly the need for a list of tie-breakers, plus a random solution in case the tie-breakers fail. Not relevant to public elections, which is our 1st concern, but nevertheless needed _frequently_ by committees, such as SWC & ER-ADMIN. Also of interest to committees is voting when there's no official method, or when some don't like the official method, situations for which I've discussed remedies in this letter. *** Anyway, in general, I agree to the outline proposal in your latest letter, with the suggestions that I've made for limiting it to proposed methods. *** I suggest the following series of possible SWC projects: 1. Discussion, recommendation, report & FAQ on the proposed methods. 2. Same, on general topic of single-winner methods for public elections. 3. Same on small elections, such as committee votes. *** Excuse the length & non-structuredness of this letter. *** Mike
