there is a paper by Woodall in which he demonstrates that no preferential single-winner election method can meet the following four properties simultaneously [Douglas R. Woodall, "An impossibility theorem for electoral systems," Discrete Mathematics, vol. 66, p. 209-211, 1987]: 1) monotonicity; 2) later-no-help and later-no-harm; 3) if no second preferences are expressed and candidate A has a plurality of first preferences, then candidate A must be elected; 4) if more than half of the voters strictly prefer candidate A and candidate B to every other candidate, then either candidate A or candidate B must be elected. Which of Woodall's properties would you be prepared to see not satisfied by your preferred system? ----- D- How many of such tests relate to YES/NO, head to head and/or place votes tables ??? Test 3) fails simple majority rule. Test 4) seems to be a variant of YES majority votes.
