EM list: Blake pointed out that, with 0-info, in an election where A has a utility of 1, C has a utility of 0, & B has a utility inbetween, with Condorcet, a voter could sometimes have incentive to rank B equal to A, in 1st place, even though he likes B less than A. That's true. If B's utility is greater than .8, then it's to your advantage to rank B in 1st place, with A. That means that you'll have that incentive about 1/5 of the time, 20%. So you can have incentive to not vote your AB preference. And with Margins, it's to your advantage to not vote your BC preference if B's utility is less than 5/16. So you'll have that incentive about 31.25% of the time. So, with both methods, it will sometimes be to your advantage to not express a preference. But with Margins you have that incentive about 1.5 times as often. I'd say that means that Margins is about 1.5 times as insincere as Condorcet, even with 0-info. *** If anyone requests it, I'll post the way I got those results when there's time to, in a few days. If you doubt those results, you could ask me to posts how I got them, or you could start by calculating your own version of those answers, and then, if they differ from my answers, we should both post our derivations. Either way. *** Mike Ossipoff ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
