EM list-- When there's no information about other voters, and Condorcet is used, there are 2 situations where you could improve your outcome by voting B equal to A. They're both circular ties. Because 0-info Condorcet has no incentive for truncation or order-reversal, a circular tie is a natural circular tie. In one case, it's a natural circular tie where A barely beats B, and you & one other person could reverse that defeat by not voting your AB preference. Maybe a B victory is worth more to you than the ABC lottery of the circular tie solution. In the other case, it's again a natural circular tie, but the circular tie isn't in doubt. But B & C are near-tied for having the lowest wv. So you can gain by helping B by not voting A over B, if A beats B. *** What this amounts to is that you have the option of trading some of A's chance of winning when A has a 1st-choice majority for an edge in natural circular ties. Of course you don't have to, and you could vote sincerely, and if everyone does, then if A is favorite of a majority, then A wins. But since you're getting a little more than you're losing in the trade, there's incentive to do it. So what's the problem? You're not ditching your AB preference in order to get your due, as you might have to if upranking B were the only way to elect B when B has a clear rightful win. You've already got that, voting sincerely; and you don't lose it even if you make the trade, voting A=B. You're merely trading some of A's majority win for some B circular tie win, improving your chances in a situation where no one has a clearly rightful win. And getting slightly the best in the bargain. Mike Ossipoff ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
