Steve Eppley wrote: [snip] >But if you're referring to "offensive" >tactical opportunities in IRO, as I recall they're not a problem. [snip] Consider the recent disclosure that Nixon and Buchanan plotted to finance an African-American candidate to draw votes from the Democratic nominee in 1972. Could this work under IRO? Well, yes, though it is not as easy as under plurality and requires some assumptions about preferences. Assume most Muskie voters would choose Nixon second and virtually all Chisholm voters choose Muskie second. Now if Chisholm runs third (N45, M30, C25), Nixon has wasted Ross Perot's money financing her; Muskie wins in IRO. But what if Nixon and his supporters are devious enough to throw 10/45 of their first place votes to Chisholm? Now we have N35,M30,C35 and Nixon wins the instant run-off. This is what I meant in prior postings criticizing IRO for creating incentives to rank one's least favorite first. If Nixon has a clear plurality but figures to lose if Muskie runs second, and if Muskie and Chisholm are reasonably close for second, then some Nixon voters may well vote for Chisholm even without any coordinated strategy, figuring the likelihood that enough others will do so to elect Chisholm is remote. But a coordinated strategy involving a select list of voters who will respond to a signal from the plurality candidate's team on election day is the most likely scenario. Remember, Buchanan is still with us. -- Hugh Tobin
