1. Plain Condorcet only makes relative rankings no matter how much is the "absolute" support for any candidate. 2. The competitors (top 2 runoff, approval voting, instant run-off) to plain Condorcet all can routinely produce a majority winner (who in many cases will not be the Condorcet winner). 3. Plain Condorcet has a major problem with the strategies involving candidates having a high plurality of first choice votes (or candidates having a nearly equal number of first choice votes) and truncated votes. Examples 1. A 49, B 50, C 1 (an extreme example) 2. A 45, B 41, C 14 3. A 34, B 33, C 33 Each of the high plurality or nearly equal candidates will tell their supporters not to vote for any other candidate while attempting to get votes from the candidate(s) who have few first choice votes. Regarding circular ties and truncated votes- See Subj: Re: Circular Tie Percentages??? Date: Sun, Nov 17, 1996 2:48 AM EDT by Mr. Ossipoff. 4. A plain Condorcet tie breaker winner will by definition have been defeated by at least one other candidate (if the tie breaker is the fewest votes against in his/her worst defeat). Is Mr. Ossipoff ready to take the total political heat from the media, the defeated candidates and the voters who voted to defeat such winner if and when such an event occurs ? Is there no strategic instability in plain Condorcet ?
