Forwarded message: This is in reply to David's recent letter with the same subject line. After replying, I noticed that my reply wasn't posted, and that the message's "Reply to:" line wasn't EM. So l'm forwarding my reply to EM. > > Al > All of my examples for Votes-Against vs Margins have been > spatial examples, with a 1-dimensional policy-space or > political spectrum. Some might object that that's a simplification, > but it's a plausible one, and there really does tend to be > such a policy space. In fact that has much to do with causing > there to be a Condorcet winner. > > Now, I've thoroughly discussed Votes-Against with regard to > the need for defensive strategy, with special emphasis on > elections with 1-dimensional policy-space. But let me just > repeat the highlights: In Votes-Against, defensive strategy > needn't include voting for a more-liked alternative equal to or > over a less-liked one. And, if there's a Condorcet winner, and > if no one attempts offensive order-reversal, there's _no_ need > for _any_ defensive strategy. No one need do other than rank > sincerely as many alternatives as they want to, without regard > to defensive strategy. > > I've shown why that isn't true of Margins. I've shown that > mere truncation can make necessary a defensive strategy of > ranking a less-liked alternative equal to your favorite. > I've shown that order-reversal, which Margins doesn't deter, > can make necessary the defensive strategy of ranking a less-liked > alternative _over_ your favororite, in the Margins method. > Again I ask: Can a method get worse than that? > > Mike > >
