> > Say there are 3 candidates, and your favorite comes in "middle" in > > the Approval count. Your favorite is B. > > > > B is sincere CW--is preferred to both A & C by more voters than >vice-versa. > > A pairwise beats C. > > > >If B is the sincere CW under Condorcet, then she will win in Approval >Seeded SP, at least my version. Whether B starts in the middle or the >bottom of the seeded list, she will win every pairwise comparison all of >the way to the top. Certainly, if B is the _voted_ CW. But B could be the sincere CW without being the voted CW. If the A voters truncate, and don't vote B over C, then they can allow C to beat B, even if B is sincere CW. Then B is out of the election. And if A voters actually order-reverse against B, voting C over B, then likewise they can make C beat B, even if the C voters strategically refuse to vote C over B. C voters, in order to save B, could then have to vote B over C, in violation of WDSC & FBC. Either way, it's then between A & C, and A beats C under sincere voting (by assumption). I could write an example in which the B voters then can't prevent A from winning without insincerely voting C over A. > > The Approval finishing order is > > A, B, C. Some A voters truncate in the BC election. So, even though > > B is sincere CW, B loses to C. > > > > When C goes agains A, A wins. > >In my version, A loses to B, so A stays at the bottom and is never >compared to C. But I'm saying the Approval finishing order is A, B, C. So the 1st contest is between B & C. An example can be written in which truncation or order-reversal by some A voters can allow or cause C to beat B, even though B is sincere CW. I admit that SFC, GSFC, FBC, & WDSC aren't criteria that you'll find in journal articles, and so you might say that Approval-Seeded SD's violation of those criteria isn't important. Not in the academic world. But voters are very concerned about the lesser-of-2-evils problem, and majority rule is a popular standard. I claim that the defensive strategy criteria are the ones that best measure for both of those standards. I should add the disclaimer that it's always possible that I don't understand the method, or am making some other error. But it seems to me that those criteria aren't met by that method. Again, I admit that those criteria aren't used in the academic world, but I claim that they're about things that are important to voters. In a meeting, when there's no computer, and a handraising vote is desired, and there isn't time for any pairwise-count method, then Sequential Pairwise isn't a bad solution, provided that people are vigilant about order-reversal, and willing to retaliate against it on a subsequent vote involving the reversers' alternative. Approval is a good way to seed SD. A quicker way is to write the alternatives on the blackboard, in a vertical list, and flip a coin to decide whether to start from the top or the bottom of that list. Myself, I'd much rather use Approval than SD in a meeting, however, because Approval is such a good public elections proposal that I'd want to demonstrate Approval in the meeting. Mike Ossipoff _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
