Approval-Seeded SP meets WDSC. What I'd missed was the fact that, because it uses Approval to determine the order of the pairwise comparisons, a majority has the power to ensure that A will get a better Approval score than B will, merely by voting for A (and everyone whom they like more), and not for B. Since B has a lower Approval score than A does, B can't win SP without going against A, whom he can't beat, since (by WDSC's premise), a majority prefer A to him. But Approval-Seeded SP doesn't meet SFC or FBC. Those are difficult criteria to meet, and only a few methods meet them. Approval meets FBC, and Condorcet meets SFC (and in at least some versions, GSFC & SDSC). That's why, so far, apparently no other method can match the merit of Approval and Condorcet. Tom's Elimination Cumulative (as I call it), doesn't meet FBC or SFC either. Approval & Condorcet are as popular as they are because nothing has matched them yet. Mike Ossipoff _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
