Hi, I have been following this list with interest and would like to point out that there is a literature (going back to Condorcet) about the effects of a voting method on the group probability of making a correct choice. (See my "The Condorcet-Jefferson Connection and the Origins of Social Choice Theory" in Public Choice, 1991.) I have done simulations of the effects of one person, one vote, approval, and other methods on group judgmental accuracy. In juries, jurors prefer a choice because it is a better fit of the facts. Of course, their subjective or performance-based competencies could be factored into computing the collective outcome. The Shapley-Grofman theorem does this. Anyone interested in this? Arnie Anthony Simmons wrote: > >> From: Blake Cretney > >> Subject: [EM] Social Utility > > [snip] > > >> But let's say you have a group of people voting on whether > >> the universe will always expand, or will eventually > >> contract. This is an objective question. The correct > >> answer is independent of the will of the voters, and to > >> answer it, the voters have to make educated guesses about > >> the world around them. Any answer will only be a guess, > >> but we would want the method to pick the guess most likely > >> to be right, based on the votes. It isn't as clear that > >> utility measures would be useful in this kind of election. > > Here's a nifty complication: If we were to vote on a matter > of objective fact, what would we really be voting on? On > whether a particular fact happens to be true? Or whether we > should take a particular action -- officially announcing that > a fact is true. These aren't necessarily the same thing. In > the latter case, I may have reasons other than objective fact > for voting the way I do. I'm sure if we thought hard enough, > we could come up with a hypothetical situation in which, for > example, legislators might vote to modify the science > curriculum in Kansas for reasons not entirely confined to > science in Kansas. Hypothetically. In such a case, social > utility determines perceived fact. Though this could also be > considered a question of making a decision about the > curriculum rather than just a matter of fact. > > It's a pretty commonly heard adage that we can't vote on > matters of objective fact. Well, obviously, we can, but the > result carries no weight. > > Yes, we do sometimes have to vote on matters of pure fact, > but not really. For example, climatologists might be asked > to vote on whether CO2 production is turning the whole planet > into a Devonian swamp. But we would only do that if it were > necessary to make a decision of some sort. It might be > whether to stop using fossil fuels and start building psychic > reactors. Or it might even be an implied election -- in > which there is no formal vote, but simply a recognition of > the relative abundance of opinions -- that influences a > personal decision, such as whether to buy an electric scooter > or a sport-utility-amphibious-armored-vehicle. > > But to the extent that there is a social decision to abide by > an election outcome in any meaninful sense, doesn't there > have to be a consequent action of some sort? Even if the > question being voted on is nothing more than the "sense of > Congress" clause of HB1189, which only expresses an opinion", > the whole point of that is to influence. > > It's an interesting question -- is it meaningful to vote on a > pure matter of objective fact? Whatever the answer to that > question, I think a more practical question is: does it > affect the choice of election method.
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