the details about the method I can only speculate.
Imagine that each voter is given a computer which is running a standard piece
of software that implements a standard strategy algorithm. The software
takes a voter's ratings input and runs it through the strategizer, which
calculates the voter's ideal approval ballot based on current statistical
information (initially a zero-info strategy). The result is forwarded to
a central computer which counts the votes and then predicts the likelihood
of various outcomes in the next round. This could be done by treating the
current round as a statistical sampling, for instance. The information is
sent back to the voters' computers, which then adjust their approval
ballots, and the process is repeated until a winner is converged upon.
If I were to give my computer insincere ratings, I am in effect claiming
to be a better strategizer than the system is. If instead I give it sincere
ratings, I am trusting the system to be a better strategizer than I am.
Since the strategizing software is continuously making adaptations to
the political environment, as reported by the central computer, I suspect
that I would be wrong to think I could do a better job.
Also, I don't think such a system would perfectly maximize utilities, but
would do as good a job as Approval would do if all voters voted optimum
Approval strategy. So the system is more of a "strategy assistant" to the
voters than it is a "result optimizer". Plus, the system could also collect
the presumably sincere ratings after the fact to determine how strong the
winner's mandate really is (in an SU sense, that is).
Richard
Forest Simmons wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]">This is more of a query about Lori Cranor's method than anything else.
If it really gives no strategic incentive for distorting ratings, it
sounds like the ideal way to use CR ballots.
Here's what puzzles me. On the one hand, it seems like any method like Ms
Cranor's that uses CR ballots to formulate optimal Approval Strategies
should be able to do so in a way that would give the win to the candidate
with the greatest average rating.
If that is the case, then it seems like any strategy that would improve
the average rating of your favorite on the CR ballot would be tempting. In
other words, one would be tempted to distort ratings.
On the other hand, if the method doesn't give the win to a maximally rated
candidate, then it probably isn't much better than plain old Approval in
social utility.
Can you shed any light! on this?
Forest
