In my Plurality WDSC failure example, the 5/6 should be replaced with 1/2. Half of the 60% who prefer A to B have C as their favorite. Then, with 1/2 of the 60% who prefer A to B having C as their favorite, if any of those 1/2 vote for A, then they're reversing a preference. If they don't reverse a preference, A can only get votes of 30% of the voters, and can't equal A's vote total. This time, C only gets 30% too, and A wins. WDSC's premise that a majority prefer A to B is met, and that majority doesn't have a way to ensure that A won't win without reversing a preference, and so WDSC's requirement is not met, and so Plurality fails WDSC, though it passes both of Markus's criteria , the ones that are what WDSC looks like to him. Mike Ossipoff _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
