Rob LG wrote: But I feel justified in using the word "vicious" to describe Mike's attacks on margins. I reply: That's the 1st time I've heard of "vicious" being applied to how someone speaks of a voting system. "Vicious" is a strongly emotional word to describe my disapproval of a lousy voting system. Rob continues: He seems to see margins methods as betraying all that's good about Condorcet methods. I reply: I didn't say it betrayed anything. I said that it _lacks_ all of what's good about the good Condorcet methods. And it has all of the worst problems that pairwise-count methods can have. You know, the IRVies are right about a few things: Approvalists & IRVies agree that the pairwise-count methods are a strategic mess. And it's true--except that they don't usually realize that there are exceptions. Margins isn't an exception. The IRVies are also right when they say that Condorcetists live in an ivory tower, not even within hailing distance of the voter and his/her concerns. Again, there are a few exceptions, but only a few. Rob continues: Given the importance he ascribes to his strategy criteria I reply: I ascribe importance to certain standards, because I've noticed the adverse results of failing those standards. I often hear people complaining about the results of the failure of those standards. My criteria are my effort to measure for those standards. If Martin adds some new ones, great. Rob is all concerned that people will be able to gain under some conditions by unequally ranking some equally-preferred lower choices, or insincerely upranking their 2nd choice, when it's a natural circular tie. I have no idea why Rob considers those as problems. What political problems will they cause? What voter complaints will remain unsolved due to adopting wv? Rob's finding of strategy possibilities in wv isn't an astounding discovery--I mentioned that Gibbard & Satterthwaite have shown that every method will sometimes have situations where someone can gain by strategy. So I'm instead concerned about the gross strategy problem known as the lesser-of-2-evils problem, or the strategic need for drastic insincerity. That person who insincerely upranks his 2nd choice equal to his favorite in wv isn't doing so to protect a CW. It won't do him any good unless there's a natural circular tie. He's trying for a slight increase in expectation, which can only pay off if there's a natural circular tie. I don't regard him as victimized or suffering a serious strategy dilemma. Rob is bothered by a strategic temptation, hoping for payoff if there's a natural circular tie. And this is only about 0-info elections, something that doesn't happen in public elections. I'm more concerened about strategic need to abandon a favorite. As for insincerely ranking unequal some equally-preferred lower choices-- again, that's a temptation, not a need. Someone can get some gain of expectation by doing so in a 0-info election (which doesn't exist in public elections). I'm sorry, but I don't feel sorry for someone who is tempted to rank unequally some candidates among whom he has no preferences. What is he losing? What's the problem? Who is wronged? A CW who is so poorly supported that indifferent voters can defeat him by falsification? Maybe Rob is worried about indifferent, marginally- supported CWs. So Rob's supposed strategy problems of wv don't sound much like problems. Meanwhile, his Path Voting will sometimes elect your last choice because you didn't vote some lesser-evil compromise alone in 1st place, over your favorite. Rob says that the guarantees of my criteria are too easily gotten-around. For instance, SFC & GSFC don't apply if there's falsification of preferences. But I claim that's unlikely on a scale sufficient to change the election result. And with Path Voting, there's no need to do anything to get-around those guarantees--they don't exist at all with Path Voting. So a method that doesn't offer those SFC & GSFC guarantees at all is as good as one that can't offer them if there's large-scale falsification? Falsification is how those guarantees are gotten around. But how is SDSC gotten around in wv? It isn't. For the methods that meet SDSC, the guarantee is absolute. Contrary to Rob, SDSC can't be gotten-around. Again, though, its guarantee doesn't exist for Path Voting. With Path Voting, there are times when a majority can make someone lose only if a large number of them vote some lesser-evil alone in 1st place, over their favorite. That sounds a lot like Plurality, IRV, & Borda. SDSC? Path Voting & RP(m) don't even meet WDSC. Rob continues: There are a lot of really smart people on this list. It's a shame mutual respect isn't more apparent. I reply: What, did I disrespect Margins? I admit that it meets as many defensive strategy criteria as Plurality, IRV, & Borda. I carefully make a point of at least matching other people's respect level. Mike Ossipoff _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
