Blake has said that people who unequally rank candidates whom they prefer equally can steal the election in wv, just as truncators & order-reversers can do so in Margins. Oh yes? Let's go back to my example #2, my order-reversal example, the 201,200,100 example. And let's say that the 201 A voters are, this time, indifferent between B & C. But say that they, having heard Blake's suggestion, decide to insincerely rank C over B, though they have no preference between B & C. Result: The same. B is still the sincere CW. If everyone voted sincerely, B would win. But when these voters who are indifferent between B & C decide to vote C over B, they thereby steal the election from B. And, again, for the same reason, that doesn't work in wv. Contrary to Blake's claim, falsification between equally-preferred candidates, a sort of half-strength relative of order-reversal, can't succeed in wv unless its victims trust & help their victimizers, just as is the case with order-reversal. I haven't checked tonight's e-mail yet, but, for now, I'll repeat my request that Blake, Rob LG, or Richard post an example in which wv fails as badly as Margins fails in my 2 Margins examples. Actually, now it's 3 Margins examples, if we count the one in this message, which consists of example 2, but with the A voters indifferent between B & C. I'll call that new one "example 3". Mike Ossipoff _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
