RE: [EM] Responses to some of Forest's ideas

[LAYTON Craig]

49 A>B>C sincere utilities 100>1>0
48 C>B>A sincere utilities 100>1>0
 3 B>C>A sincere utilities 100>0>1

Here, 97% of the voters would prefer to flip a coin between A and C than to
see B win.  The best individual strategy may be to vote sincerely, but the
best group strategy is to flip the coin.  While this couldn't reasonably be
organised in a public election, a preferential swap could. ie party A
instructs voters to vote A>C>B (or A / A>B=C) & party C instructs voters to
vote C>A>B on their how to vote cards, and they take their chances.

The low utility condorcet winner scenario can actually increase the
incentive to vote insincerely in a Condorcet method.