On Thu, 26 Jul 2001, Forest Simmons wrote: > There are precious few methods besides regular Approval that have been > proposed which satisfy the FBC. > > Demorep's ACMA and ACLA and other versions of Approval Completed Condorcet > are among the few seriously proposed methods that satisfy this important > property. > > Another variation that seems to satisfy the FBC is this: > > Of the two candidates with the most approval, take the one that is > preferred over the other by the greater margin of voters. > > This can be thought of as an instant runoff where the two candidates that > qualify for the second (i.e. final) round are picked by Approval. A variation of this method is to mark the approval cutoff by truncation: Of the two candidates truncated by the fewest number of voters the pairwise winner is the method winner. I like the Five Slot Ballot version: Of the two candidates with the greatest number of passing grades, the one that is given a higher grade than the other by the greater number of voters is the method winner. Forest
