Forest wrote- Here's an example of an Approval election that could be used to test the current best efforts at FBC definition (absolute utilities in parentheses).
45 A($100) B($60) C($20) 30 B($100) C($60) A($20) 25 C($100) A($60) B($20) --- D- First plus second choices A 65 B 75 C 55 Votes to get bare majority (51) A 45 plus 6 of 25 B 30 plus 21 of 45 C 25 plus 26 of 30 $60 median for each 51st vote. Does B win (by satisfying the highest/ earliest majority) ??? As usual I note that in reality land of real public elections there would be a whole lot of $100 and $0 votes (with any 2nd or later choice $100 vote being conditional that it does not hurt an earlier choice).
