Dear Mike, you wrote (11 Jan 2002):
> But if IIAC, as Arrow intended it, isn't met by any method, > then why wouldn't he mention that? If nothing meets IIAC, > then there'd be no point in listing those other criteria, > the ones in his impossibility theorem. If nothing meets IIAC, > then why bother saying that nothing meets all the criteria > in some list that includes IIAC? I really don't know of a > method that meets that particular IIAC, and so I was just > asking. If you know of one, tell me of it. I have already mentioned in one of my last mails that there are election methods that meet IIAC. I wrote (9 Jan 2002): > Random Candidate meets "Independence from Irrelevant > Alternatives" and violates "Independence from Clones". > Tideman's Ranked Pairs method meets "Independence from Clones" > and violates "Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives". Also Random Dictatorship meets IIAC. So there are election methods that meet IIAC. ****** You wrote (11 Jan 2002): > How I define sincere voting?: > A voter votes sincerely if s/he doesn't reverse a sincere > preference or fail to vote a sincere preference that the > balloting system in use would allow hir to vote in addition > to the preferences that s/he actually did vote. > Of course reversing a sincere preference means voting B over > A when you prefer A to B. Voting a preference for A over B > means voting A over B. You're then voting a sincere preference > for A over B if you prefer A to B. How do you define "sincere voting" for other election methods than preferential election methods? ****** You wrote (12 Jan 2002): > Most rank methods, even if monotonic, fail Participation & > Consistency. Borda is the only rank method that I know to pass > those 2 criteria. All positional election methods meet monotonicity, participation and consistency. Markus Schulze
