The more I think about it the more I prefer Borda Seeded Bubble Sort as a simple, high utility, hard to manipulate, method satisfying the Condorcet Criterion, when limited to pure ranked preference ballots where truncation, Yes/No, NOTB, etc. are not allowed or provided for.
The Borda order is sorted down to the bottom seeded candidate Z by (recursively) bubble sorting all of the candidates above candidate Z before percolating Z upward until Z is defeated in a pairwise comparison. This method is easy to describe (even without the simplicity of recursion), always picks a winner from the Smith set, is monotonic (I believe), satisfies the Reverse Symmetry Criterion, and encourages insincere ranking of candidates even less than Borda Seeded Single elimination. In a nut shell here's why I think it gives less incentive for insincere ranking: Suppose you prefer X to Y but you are told that X might spoil Y's chance of winning without X going on to victory (because Y has a better chance according to the polls). In both methods (Bubble and Single Elimination) you could say, "To heck with the polls, if X gets a higher Borda count than Y, then I say X has a better chance. I don't trust those polls anyway." But after you vote X ahead of Y you begin to worry. What if X is seeded below Y, and then (in single elimination) over-takes and defeats Y, and then goes no further, dashing Y's hopes of winning without having the steam to keep going? This could never happen in Bubble Sort. If X is seeded below Y, then Y has already risen to its apogee before any possible challenge from X. Candidate X cannot hurt Y from below in Bubble Sort. The Borda Seeding should give the method near maximal Social Utility for a method based on pure ranked preference ballots (no Approval marker, etc.) and satisfying the condition of always picking from the Smith set. Forest
