Dear Forest, you wrote (27 Feb 2002): > Markus wrote (27 Feb 2002): > > Forest wrote (26 Feb 2002): > > > It seems to me that another problem of Copeland methods is that they > > > encourage favorite betrayal in the same way IRV does: if your compromise > > > has a better chance of winning the election than your favorite, but your > > > favorite has a good chance of beating your compromise, then you (and like > > > minded voters) vote your compromise above your favorite to maximize your > > > compromise's chance of getting one more win. > > > > In so far as Copeland is monotonic, you cannot increase your favorite's > > chance of winning the elections by voting another candidate above your > > favorite. > > But you can increase your compromise's chance by voting you compromise > above your favorite.
Yes, but this is true for every Condorcet method. Blake Cretney calls this strategy "compromising". Every Condorcet method is vulnerable to "compromising". Markus Schulze
