>5: ABCDE >6: BCDEA >7: CDEAB >8: DEABC >9: EABCD
The only ranked method discussed here that does NOT hand this election to E is IRV. Borda count reduces this to 1: BCDEA 2: CDEAB 3: DEABC 4: EABCD And the Borda scores are 20, 15, 15, 17, 30, for A, B, C, D, and E, respectively. E wins by a huge margin. In Condorcet voting, the Smith/Schwartz set is every candidate, there are no ties, and every voter expressed a full ballot. So all the Condorcet methods are pretty much the same. Ranked pairs overturns D>E and C>E (in that order). SSD drops C>E, B>D, D>A, A>C, E>B, and D>E, (in that order). Both results leave E unbeaten. In IRV, A is eliminated first, then C, then E (by a count of 11B 15C 9E). E gets screwed by having the wrong votes transfer. B wins the election, even though B finished dead last in Borda Count and only beats one candidate pairwise. If the Approval cutoff is consistent, then Approval elects E as well. Plurality of course elects E as well. So really, only IRV can screw this one up. It's not tremendously illustrative (sorry). -Adam
