Alex wrote in part- It is not unreasonable to assume this profile:
30% Bill > George > Ross 7% Bill > Ross > George 25% Ross > George > Bill 6% Ross > Bill > George 25% George > Bill > Ross 7% George > Ross > Bill The runoff is between Slick Bill and Papa George. 25% of the electorate defects to Papa George, and Papa George wins. Note that Papa George is in fact the Condorcet winner, and Crazy Ross is the Condorcet loser. Now, suppose that 2% of the electorate, all from the Bill>George>Ross camp, votes strategically and lists Ross>Bill>George. Slick Bill now has 35% first place votes, Crazy Ross has 33% first place votes, and Papa George has 32% first place votes. The runoff is Crazy Ross vs. Slick Bill, and Slick Bill wins. --- D- Who, if anybody, has a YES majority in either example ??? I note in the first example there is (for first place votes only) -- 37 % Bill 31 % Ross 32 % George That is -- George > Ross by 1 %. (first place votes only). The general point is that strategy games can happen near *boundaries* with 3 or more choices.
