Say there are 3 candidates: A,B, &C. They're on a 1-dimensional political spectrum, and B is the sincere CW. I'll be more specific:
100: ABC 49: BAC 75: CBA Voters who share the same favorite vote the same. Each such faction is a player. For simplicity, this is a complete-preference-info example. If something less simple is desired, then I urge someone to do a probability-info example, maybe with more candidates, maybe with the favoriteness-groups divided into more player-factions. With the winning-votes methods, there's an equilibrium in which no one reverses a sincere preference and no one ranks a less-liked candidate equal to someone who is included in their ranking. With margins, the only equilibria are ones in which defensive order-reversal is used. If we disallow offensive order-reversal as a strategy, then wv has an equilibrium in everyone sincerely ranks all of the candidates. Even if we disallow offensive order-reversal, margins' equilibria still all include defensive equal-top-ranking (ranking a less-preferred compromise equal to one's favorite). Mike Ossipoff _________________________________________________________________ Join the world�s largest e-mail service with MSN Hotmail. http://www.hotmail.com
