>We thus have the following ordering: >(C,V) S >V S C >S (V, C)
>We thus have the following ordering: >(C,V) S >V S C >S (V, C) Vanilla is the Condorcet winner. Chocolate is the Condorcet loser. No need to assume preferences among the voted indifferences. Perhaps an example that truly produces a circular tie would be more illustrative. Also, your example supposes we can have two winners. Nobody has seriously advocated the use of Condorcet voting in multi-winner elections. So, for the sake of applicability, I'd suggest making single-winner examples to test your idea. >I'll need to look closer at Condorcet (wv) to form an opinion, though I >don't doubt it's an excellent method (I generally like Condorcet methods >anyway, though Approval is probably as complicated as the electorate can >handle). Still, I will say that rewarding ties, truncations, and masking of >voter preferences over full and complete preference lists would seem to be >a flaw in an election method. Better to punish for a lack of relevant >information rather than too much. I would advise you take a serious look at your method before you advocate it strongly. Lots of intuitively appealing ideas actually open the door to strategic manipulation rather than create more democratic results. -Adam
