I like it!!!!!!!! It would give greater security to voters afraid to "dilute" their vote for favorite, which many novices think is an advantage of IRVIt is more conducive to majoritarian principles, which IRV promoters often talk about. Also, because voters would have less fear of "diluting" their vote for favorite it would encourage cross-over voting, which once again helps centrists.
I might actually like this better than Condorcet, due to its relative simplicity. As Joe pointed out, if Condorcet were adopted there would still be an argument over the completion method, and although most people on this list are convinced that one or another method is ideal, most of our evaluations get technical. I don't know how well that would go over in a policy debate. I would suggest a minor modification, however: Let people indicate more than one preferred choice, so that in the presence of (perceived) clones voters could put both clones number 1. Simply put three ratings on the ballot: Preferred, Approved, Disapproved. If more than one person is rated "Preferred" by a majority the one with the most "preferred" votes wins. If nobody is "preferred" by a majority then do just as Forest suggested: Whoever has the fewest "disapproved" votes (or, equivalently, the most approved plus preferred) wins. Finally, the increase in expense/complexity should be minimal. In my area, as long as the machines can read paper ballots with three circles next to each name there should be no need to buy new machines. Alex ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
