>(A classic 3-way race was the 1998 gubernatorial race in Minnesota. >Ventura, the Dem, and Repubiican were all in the vicinity of 30%.)
In an approval election, the polls won't look quite like that, since presumably the pollsters will ask "who will you vote for?" which could be more than one candidate. So this will change the ways the polls appear, which will change who the frontrunners appear to be, which will change people's impression of which "lesser evil" they need to approve, which will change the polls, and so on. This process will tend to stabilize due to the presence of Nash equilibria, and these equilibria nearly always favor the Condorcet winner. Basically, what I am arguing is that the movement of candidates in the polls will constitute a crude form of DSV (declared strategy voting) with Approval, or non-cumulative repeated approval balloting as Forest and Rob LeGrand would call it. -Adam ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
