Mike wrote a while back: >I read that Riker proved that when voters have complete information about >eachother's preferences, and act to optimize their immediate outcome, the >sincere CW will win, no matter what (nonprobabilistic?) voting system is >used.
If this is true then perhaps it is possible to come up with a system satisfying "strong FBC." Suppose that we all input our preference orders into a computer. The program looks at what we all want, and assigns each of us the best strategy to optimize our outcome given info on the other voters' preferences. The sincere CW will then win after we've all been assigned a strategy that gives us the best shot at what we want. In that case, there's no reason to rank anybody equal to favorite, so strong FBC is satisfied. The assigned strategy may place somebody equal to favorite, but the initial input can place favorite as #1. However, this seems suspect to me. The issue of cycles comes to mind... In any case, I would like to know where you found out about this. Given Riker's work it may be possible to come up with an existence or impossibility proof for voting systems that satisfy strong FBC. Either one would be important. And, since there either is or is not a way to satisfy strong FBC one of those proofs should be possible (is that an existence proof? ;) Alex ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
