Alex wrote: > Question: Can we come up with a voting method such that you never have an > incentive to lie to the computer? If so, then it doesn't matter if your > assigned strategy is insincere, we still satisfy strong FBC.
See my post on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem at: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/8793 Basically, the only way to take ranked ballots as input and choose a winner so that no voter would ever have reason to vote insincerely is to choose the winner according to *one* of the ballots, in effect giving dictator powers to that voter. If it's acceptable for the election method to be that random, then it's a perfect system. Otherwise, nothing will do. Even if a Small Voting Machine were carefully formulated and built, it would still be possible for a voter to gain by voting insincerely. I gave a lot of thought to a similar idea a while ago, but I gave up on it when I realized that the G-S theorem would still apply no matter what went on inside the SVM black box. I imagine that an SVM or Cumulative Repeated Approval Balloting would remove incentive for insincerity about as much as would be practical, but of course the public would be unlikely to support such complicated systems. At least with Approval, you never have reason not to vote for your favorite, even if you can't express every single preference. I love Richard's explanation for why the Approval winner could be seen as preferable to the Condorcet winner when the two are different. I also like the revised Bucklin idea, the one that allows multiple levels and multiple candidates at each level. I guess revised Bucklin is to regular Bucklin as CR is to Borda. More investigation of this idea . . . ? -- Rob LeGrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.aggies.org/honky98/ __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! Health - your guide to health and wellness http://health.yahoo.com ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
