Donald has voiced repeated objections to methods that fail (among other criteria) to guarantee the election of the first choice of the majority (assuming he exists) and allow lower choices to harm preferred candidates.
Let's go one step further with 3-level approval to satisfy the first objection and at least give the lower choices less weight: Use Cardinal Ratings, and stipulate that if a majority gives somebody the highest rating then he wins (if two such candidates exist then whichever is given the highest rating by a larger majority, to handle perceived clones). Otherwise, elect the candidate with the highest average rating. To mitigate incentives for insincerely rating somebody equal to favorite I recommend using a wide scale, say 0 to 5 or 0 to 10. This way you can (if you wish) give a lower choice weight very nearly equal to your favorite, but you can also give him much lower weight if you wish. This seems to retain the advantages of 3-level approval, but gives voters more flexibility. There is a slightly stronger incentive to insincerely rate somebody equal to favorite, but using a wide scale should substantially mitigate that. Comments? Alex ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
