On Sat, 22 Jun 2002 08:45:17 -0700 Bart Ingles wrote: > > Dave Ketchum wrote: > >> While Condorcet's cyclic ambiguities can be a debate topic, >>hopefully these only occur in near-tie situations, and those who would >>debate hopefully can be locked in a closet until they can agree on a >>public position. >> > > No, sorry, there does not need to be a near-tie in order to have cycles.
MUST be approaching a tie, even if you do not like "near" as an adjective. We know that while A>B and B>C are significant enough for both to head for the winner's circle, C>A also MUST have significant backers or we could not be cyclic. > > Furthermore, you don't need to anticipate a cycle in order to have > incentive to truncate or rank insincerely. > How much of a real problem might this be, knowing the reputation for honesty that exists among those who give me the "information" I need to successfully sway the vote via "insincerity"? I have trouble thinking how truncation can get me in trouble in Condorcet - I have still given positive ranking to all I claim to care about and, via truncation, I simply rank all the leftovers as equal at the bottom of the barrel. > > >>AND, I see explaining Condorcet to voters as reasonably simple: >> Think of the candidates in order, starting with your top preference >>and continuing until you lose interest - and indicate this ordered list on >>the ballot. >> Ignore any troublemaker who talks of spoilers. Listing your desired >>minor candidate first will have ZERO effect on what your voting as to the >>major candidates does (of course, if enough voters show preference for >>that minor candidate, then that candidate would really be major and >>possibly win). >> Ignore troublemakers who talk of desiring to show the same >>preference for two or more candidates. You cannot do this, but are little >>deprived - ranking two candidates next to each other gives them the same >>preference relative to all other candidates - which you list first will >>not matter unless they are tied for winning. >> > > This sounds like CVD's strategy for promoting IRV -- i.e. lie to the > voters, telling them that "it is always advantageous to rank candidates > sincerely", "the spoiler problem is eliminated", etc. I apologize for not finding more time for EM. However, I have real trouble seeing how the spoiler stays alive, let alone having the strength it has with plurality voting. I ask above about sincerity. > > Granted, the likelihood for needing strategy is less for Condorcet > (except in certain situations), but it is not eliminated. The only > voting system I know of that eliminates strategy is "random ballot" or > some variant thereof. > Without being certain, "random ballot" sounds like giving up my right to express my desires. -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
