First of all, I call it pairwise-count, because "Condorcet" properly applies to Condorcet's own proposals for solving circular ties. IRV-completed pairwise-count has been proposed many times. Here's an example: 3 candidates: A, B, & C. Sincere rankings: 40: ABC 25: BAC 35: CBA Voted rankings: 40: A 25: BA 35: CB The A voters, the ones who are in a position to make a strategic circular tie, are also the ones who win that tie. What does it take to keep A from winning? Truncation by the B voters won't do it. The C voters could rank B equal to C, something that they wouldn't have to do in the Condorcet(wv) versions. That's a general pairwise-count defensive strategy that works against offensive truncation, but not against offensive order-reversal. If the A voters used offensive order-reversal, as margins advocates say they should, then the only defensive strategy that the C voters have is to vote B over C. IRV-completed pairwise-count doesn't offer any improvement over the general pairwise-count defensive strategies. All the strategy criticisms of pairwise-count methods, from Approval advocates and IRV advocates, apply fully to IRV-completed pairwise-count, and to the margins "Condorcet" versions. The use of a pairwise-count methods gains compliance with Condorcet's Criterion, but, as the example shows, Condorcet's Criterion isn't worth a lot by itself. Mike Ossipoff _________________________________________________________________ Join the world�s largest e-mail service with MSN Hotmail. http://www.hotmail.com ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
