It has been argued that, since people who approve m candidates may be exercising a different amount of voting power than those who approve n=/=m candidates, Approval fails to give all voters equal power.
Those making the argument are underwhelmed by my assertion that "one man, one vote" simply means my approval of candidate X should carry the same weight as somebody else's approval of candidate X (a criterion flunked by the electoral college, among other non-proportional institutions). So, if (for the sake of argument) we assume that "one man, one vote" requires equal voting power per individual, consider this circumstance: Let us make the reasonable prediction that in most approval elections there will be two or three serious front-runners. In the case of 2 front-runners, and assuming all voters can find the polling data in the newspapers, all voters will approve only one of the two serious candidates, and hence all voters will have exercised equal voting power. Those who also approve a fringe candidate have failed to exercise any additional voting power (for instance, I acknowledge that I exercised no voting power whatsoever in November of 2000 when I voted for Harry Browne. I knew what the real contest was and I opted out.). Now, suppose that there are 3 front-runners. With 3 serious candidates Approval Voting is formally equivalent to Negative Voting, where you can either vote for a candidate or vote against a candidate. In Negative voting all voters essential have one vote, to be cast for or against one candidate, and hence all voters have equal power. Or, to go back to the perspective of Approval Voting, voting for m of the n candidates gives a voter the same power as voting for n-m of the candidates. Either way, in most elections I suspect that approval voting will give all strategies equal power. Of course, this will not hold with 4 close front-runners. Alex ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
