Forest asked: > Does anybody know of an example in which IRV would give a superior > result to ordinary lone mark plurality in the case of near perfect > information, assuming the use of near optimal strategy by the > voters in both cases?
Sure. Sincere preferences: 45:Reagan>Anderson>Carter 35:Carter>Anderson>Reagan 20:Anderson>Carter>Reagan Plurality equilibrium: 49:Reagan 33:Carter 18:Carter <--- insincere IRV equilibrium: 49:Anderson>Reagan>Carter <--- insincere 33:Carter>Anderson>Reagan 18:Anderson>Carter>Reagan ===== Rob LeGrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.aggies.org/robl/ for Texas State Representative, District 50 __________________________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? New DSL Internet Access from SBC & Yahoo! http://sbc.yahoo.com ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
