Steph wrote: 2: A >B >C 4: A >C >B 2: B >A >C 3: B >C >A 2: C >A >B 0: C >B >A [...] A (4) > B (2). Note that A is the Condorcet Winner. The B >A >C voters (2) decide to believe Bart Ingles and truncate their ballots to produce insincere votes, namely B ballots. With winning votes the pairwise comparisons become: [...] A(4) > B(2). Bart wins... Note that margins and relative margins would preserve Adam's victory. Do you surrender? Please tell me where I am wrong or explain, Steph. I reply: Steph, you miscounted the ballots: There are 8 people ranking A over B. However, if, as is possible with truncation, a sub-majority number of people rank A over B, then truncation can steal the election for that poorly-supported CW. What I claim about wv is that wv methods meet GSFC & SDSC. PC(wv) might not meet GSFC, & SDSC, but it at least meets SFC. & WDSC. And I claim that margins and relative margins methods fail GSFC SFC, SDSC, & WDSC. Actually, I don't just claim those things. I've demonstrated all of them on EM. Mike Ossipoff _________________________________________________________________ Send and receive Hotmail on your mobile device: http://mobile.msn.com ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
