Adam Tarr said: > Is there a way to quantify this? Probably not a way that everyone could > agree on. But how about this example: > > 60% A > 39% B > 1% C > > All the voters assign zero utility to the other candidates. In just > about every voting system except Borda (including IRV), The A voters > are guaranteed to win. In Borda, the B voters can win my voting BCA.
Only if the A voters vote ABC. If the A voters are split evenly between ABC and ACB then A wins (120 votes for A, 78+30 votes for B, and the 1 is irrelevant). Still, the general point is well-taken: In an election where the appropriate outcome should be obvious, the Borda result is uncertain unless we know everybody's full strategy. Alex ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
