Olli Salmi wrote: >First, when a candidate is in danger of being eliminated, we are obliged to >move into his line, if we have marked a preference for him on our ballot
>Second [...] If we have voted for both the last and the second >to the last candidate, we have to step back and abstain until the >elimination has been decided, even if one of the candididates is our first >preference. Note that if you got rid of this second change to IRV (but leave the first), you no longer have Approval. Rather, you have a form of Condorcet voting. This will reliably elect the Condorcet winner if one exists, and it will elect a member of the Smith set if one does not. Beyond that, I'm not really sure - there's no equivalence to ranked pairs or beatpath, but maybe one of the more obscure Condorcet completion methods is similar to this. I wouldn't advocate this approach for public use, but it's a way to see Condorcet as an extension or a fix of runoff methods. If I were trying to talk an IRV advocate into supporting Condorcet, this might be a good tack to take - "why not let everyone vote in the elimination, so a strong compromise candidate won't get bounced too early?" -Adam ---- For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
